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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 




First, this Court should reverse because the trial court violated double jeopardy by 
entering an increased sentence at the August review hearing. Ronald Dean Udy had a 
legitimate expectation of finality in the oral sentencing decision imposed at the May 
sentencing hearing because the trial court did not expressly reserve the option to change 
that oral sentencing decision at the August review hearing. Neither the trial court's 
informal remark at the end of the May sentencing hearing nor the unsigned May 3 order 
undermined Udy's legitimate expectation of finality. This issue is preserved or can be 
reached under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Second, this Court should reverse because the trial court violated Udy's right to 
allocution and due process when it denied Udy and his counsel the opportunity to speak 
at the time of sentencing. Udy's opportunity to speak at the May sentencing hearing did 
not protect his right to speak when he was resentenced at the August review hearing. This 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
issue is preserved or can be reached through the plain error doctrine or rule 22(e). Udy 
does not address the remainder of the State's arguments because those arguments are 
adequately addressed in the opening brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY 
ENTERING AN INCREASED SENTENCE AFTER UDY GAINED A 
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF FINALITY IN THE ORAL 
SENTENCING DECISION IMPOSED AT THE MAY HEARING 
First, Udy had a legitimate expectation of finality in the trial court's original 
sentence because jeopardy attached to the oral sentencing decision imposed by the court 
at the May sentencing hearing and the court did not explicitly reserve the option to 
change that oral sentencing decision. See infra Part LA. Second, this Court should reach 
the merits of the double jeopardy argument because it is preserved, and the State's claim 
to the contrary is inadequately briefed. Alternatively, this Court should reach the merits 
because the State does not contest that rule 22(e) applies. Instead, it assumes that rule 
22(e) applies and proceeds to the merits of the issue. See infra Part LB. 
A. Udy Had a Legitimate Expectation of Finality in the Original Sentence 
Because Jeopardy Attached to the Oral Sentencing Decision Imposed at the 
May Sentencing Hearing and the Trial Court Did Not Explicitly Reserve the 
Option to Change That Oral Sentencing Decision. 
The State asserts that the trial court "explicitly stayed imposition of the sentence at 
the May hearing" until the August review hearing. Appellee Br. at 13. It claims that its 
assertion is "clearly demonstrate[d]" by the record. Id. at 20-21. And it insists that "the 
trial court did everything it reasonably could to prevent [the] May sentence from 
becoming the final judgment." Id. at 17. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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To support its assertion, the State presents this summary of the proceedings: At the 
May sentencing hearing, the court "announced a prison sentence," but then "immediately 
'stay[ed] the imposition of that sentence.'" Appellee Br. at 13 (citing R.287:51). The 
court stayed the imposition of sentence at Udy's "own request" in order to allow Udy "to 
make one final effort to pay restitution before deciding the question of incarceration." Id. 
at 20 (citing R.287:49-50). "The trial court never stated that jail would commence after 
the August hearing depending on whether [Udy] had paid restitution." Id. at 21 (citing 
R.287:53). Rather, the court "told [Udy] that the sentence proposed at the May hearing 
depended entirely on [Udy's] subsequent behavior and that the sentence would be finally 
decided in August." IdL at 17 (citing R.287:51-53). The court "told [Udy] he might be 
sent to prison should he not pay restitution by August." Id (citing R.287:53). When the 
court spoke about probation, it "referred to future probation after serving some 
commitment." Id at 18 (citing R.287:51). At the August hearing, defense counsel stated 
"that he understood that whether or not" Udy was sentenced to prison that day "depended 
on whether [Udy] had paid restitution by that date." Id. (citing R.288:2). 
The record does not support the State's recitation of the proceedings. The State 
cites the May sentencing hearing transcript and the August review hearing transcript to 
supports its assertions. Excerpts from those transcripts are attached to the opening brief at 
Addenda D and E for the Court's review. Those pages show that: 
1. The trial court did not postpone the imposition of sentence until the August 
review hearing. When the court said at the May sentencing hearing that it would "stay the 
imposition of that sentence," it was stating that the prison terms would be stayed in favor 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of a jail term and probation. R.287:51 ("I'm going to give [Udy] 1 to 15 on the two 
second degree felonies; zero to 5 on the third; stay the imposition of that sentence. I'm 
going to make him do a year in jail. And then after the year in jail, he'll be on 36 months 
probation."); see R.288:4 (court explaining that it "suspended" the prison terms at the 
May sentencing hearing). The court's decision was consistent with common practice and 
Utah law. See Utah Code §77-18-l(2)(a) (Supp. 2010) (allowing court to, "after imposing 
sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation"); 
id. at §77-18-l(8)(a)(v) (allowing court to "require that the defendant... serve a period 
of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail" "as a condition of probation"). 
2. Udy did not ask the trial court to postpone the sentence so that he could make a 
final effort to pay restitution before being sentenced. To the contrary, defense counsel 
told the court that Udy was "ready to go forward" with sentencing that day. R.287:51. 
3. The trial court did not tell Udy that the sentence imposed at the May hearing 
depended on Udy's behavior or that the sentence would not be finally decided until 
August. On the contrary, the court said, "I'm ready to sentence [Udy]." R.287:51. It then 
sentenced Udy to prison, but stayed the prison terms and ordered Udy to serve "a year in 
jail" and "36 months probation." R.287:51. Regarding the August review hearing, the 
court told Udy that if "[y]ou have these people paid off because this money has come in 
in the 60 day time frame, I'll reconsider the jail sentence and I may cut it down." 
R.287:51. But "if you don't, you're going to do the year regardless." R.287:51. 
4. The trial court did not tell Udy that he might be sent to prison if he did not pay 
restitution by August. Appellee Br. at 17. Nor did the trial court loosely refer to "some 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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commitment" to be served before probation. See id. at 18. Rather, the court told Udy that 
he would serve a "year in jail" and "36 months probation." R.287:51. The court then told 
Udy that it would "reconsider the jail sentence" and possibly "cut it down" if Udy paid 
the restitution by the August review hearing. R.287:51. 
5. Defense counsel did not say at the August review hearing that he understood 
that whether Udy was sentenced to prison that day depended on whether Udy had paid 
the restitution. To the contrary, defense counsel said that his "understanding [was] that 
the prison was suspended" and that Udy "was sentenced to one year in the Salt Lake 
County Jail." R.288:4. Defense counsel also said that his understanding was that if Udy 
had paid the restitution by the August review hearing "there would be a discount" in the 
jail sentence, "but not that there would be additional--." R.288:4-5. Defense counsel 
could not complete his statement, however, because the trial court interrupted him. 
R.288:5; see Appellant Br. at 32-40; infra Part II.A (discussing why trial court's 
interruptions deprived Udy of his rights to allocution and due process). 
In reality, the State's argument rests on an informal comment made by the trial 
judge at the end of the May sentencing hearing and the unsigned May 3 order. Neither of 
these facts, however, undermined Udy's legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence. 
First, the court's informal remark at the end of the May sentencing hearing did not 
undermine Udy's legitimate expectation of finality because the court did not expressly 
reserve sentencing until the August review hearing. After the court imposed sentence at 
the May hearing, the court and counsel discussed the logistics of the restitution payment. 
R.287:51-53. As that discussion ended, the State commented that the check would have 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to clear before the restitution money could be delivered to the creditors. R.287:53. In 
response, the court said, "Well, I know that. The check's got to clear. We're going to be 
realistic here. But if that makes everybody feel good, and I know some of you—we had a 
mixed group here, I think, but I'm going to give him that time frame and if the money's 
not there, he's at least going to go to jail, and he may go to prison." R.287:53. 
It is evident from the record that none of the parties perceived the court's comment 
as anything more than an offhand remark. Defense counsel responded to the remark by 
saying, "Thank you, Your Honor," and continuing the discussion about restitution. 
R.287:53. And the State remained silent. R.287:53. If the State perceived the remark as a 
revocation of the already-imposed sentence, it should have requested clarification and 
asked whether the court intended to postpone sentencing until the August review hearing. 
R.287:53; see United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 339-40 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting 
government could have "asked the court to" delay sentencing, but it "never" did and 
"[i]ts afterthought on appeal simply comes too late"). That the State did not ask for 
clarification is evidence that it, like Udy, understood the comment as an offhand remark 
and felt satisfied with the sentence imposed by the trial court. R.287:45 (prosecutor 
stating that the State was not seeking prison time in Udy's case). 
Thus, as explained in the opening brief, to the extent that the trial court's informal 
remark carried any weight at all, it did not eliminate Udy's legitimate expectation in the 
finality of the sentence. See Appellant Br. at 27-28; State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, 
1J25, 17 P.3d 1145 (double jeopardy allows a trial court to "change an oral sentencing 
decision when it has specifically reserved that option pending receipt of further 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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information relevant to sentencing" (emphasis added)). Rather, the remark should be 
interpreted consistently with the sentence: Udy could receive a reduced jail term if he 
paid the restitution by the August review hearing; otherwise, he would serve a year in jail 
and thirty-six months of probation, and he could be sent to prison if he violated his 
probation. See Appellant Br. at 27-28. 
Second, the lack of a signature on the May 3 order does not undermine Udy's 
expectation of finality because Udy's expectation of finality arose from the trial court's 
oral sentencing decision. The State claims that the court must have rescinded the sentence 
it imposed at the May sentencing hearing because it did not sign the May 3 Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment order. See Appellee Br. at 14, 17. But it is the oral sentencing 
decision, not the final signed order, to which jeopardy attaches. 
The State concedes that Horrocks provides "the proper framework for analyzing 
when jeopardy attaches to judgments." Appellee Br. at 15 n.2. Horrocks says that "a final 
signed order" is not required for jeopardy to attach. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ^[23. 
Rather, jeopardy attaches to "an oral sentencing decision" unless the court "expressly 
decline [s] to impose a final sentence until it has had the opportunity to review sentencing 
information." Id. at ^[23-24.* In this case, as explained above and in the opening brief, 
1
 Although State v. Todd, 2006 UT 7, 128 P.3d 1199, does not address double jeopardy, it 
too recognizes the importance of "the oral announcement of the sentence" in determining 
a defendant's understanding of the sentence. Todd, 2006 UT 7, ^|8. That case holds that 
"the oral announcement of the sentence" triggers "the ten-day window for filing a motion 
for new trial" because "the defendant is much more likely to be immediately aware of the 
precise date of the oral announcement of the sentence." Id. Thus, Todd held that "the date 
of the oral announcement of the sentence to the defendant is the date of imposition of 
sentence^br all purposes." Id. (emphasis added). 
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the court did not expressly decline to impose sentence until the August review hearing. 
To the contrary, it imposed sentence at the May sentencing hearing and set the August 
review hearing for the purpose of reducing the jail sentence if Udy successfully paid the 
restitution. See Appellant Br. at 23-29. Thus, jeopardy attached because Udy developed a 
legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence, and the court was prohibited from 
increasing that sentence at the review hearing. See Husein, 47 8F.3d at 338. 
B. This Court Can Review Udy's Double Jeopardy Claim Because the State 
Inadequately Briefed Its Claim that the Issue Is Not Preserved and/or 
Because Udy's Sentence Is Illegal and Was Imposed in an Illegal Manner, 
This Court should reach the merits of the double jeopardy argument because it is 
properly preserved (or the failure to properly preserve it constituted ineffective assistance 
of counsel, see Appellant Br. at 30 n.2) and because it is an illegal sentence that may be 
corrected at any time under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
The State claims that Udy did not preserve the double jeopardy claim below. See 
Appellee Br. at 11. The State, however, does not support its argument with any analysis 
or citations to case law or the record. See id. Thus, this Court should disregard the State's 
preservation argument because it is inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), 
(b), (k) (appellee brief must contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on"; briefs that "are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on 
motion or sua sponte by the court"); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
(holding issue is inadequately briefed "when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking 
as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court"). 
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Moreover, the State's summarily raised preservation argument overlooks pages 
four through five of the August review hearing transcript, where defense counsel 
questioned the trial court's authority to amend the sentence at the August review hearing. 
R.288:4-5. It also overlooks defense counsel's Motion to Correct Sentence under rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See R.235-60. 
Perhaps, the State intends to argue that the issue is not preserved because defense 
counsel never used the phrase "double jeopardy" when preserving the issue for appeal. 
As explained in the opening brief, however, defense counsel's argument was sufficient to 
preserve the double jeopardy issue because it followed the traditional double jeopardy 
analysis and it satisfied both policies of the preservation rule. See Appellant Br. at 29-30. 
Even if an issue is raised "indirectly," it is properly preserved so long as it is 
"'raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it.'" State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). Thus, in State v. 
Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, 164 P.3d 1264, this Court held that the State's argument 
relying on the "Franks doctrine" was preserved even though "the State did not formally 
cite the Franks case below," because it "argued the underlying premise of the Franks 
doctrine" and this Court had "no doubt the trial court was on notice of the State's legal 
argument." Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, If 10; see, e.g., State v. Bui an, 2006 Utah App 322, 
ffl[21-22, 142 P.3d 581 (holding "counsel's objections, in conjunction with the court's 
reliance on rule 801, were sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal" because "both of the 
policies articulated in Holgate" were satisfied and "the trial court clearly understood that 
counsel's objection pertained to rule 801"), affd, 2008 UT 47; see State v. Valenzuela, 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2001 UT App 332, ^ }25 n.4, 37 P.3d 260 (addressing the identity issue even though it was 
not specifically preserved because defendant preserved the probable cause issue and the 
identity issue was included in the probable cause issue); Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 
830 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 1992) (stating that although "[defendant's] objections were not 
textbook examples of specificity," they nonetheless "adequately directed the trial judge's 
attention to the claimed error" such that "they were sufficient"). 
In sum, the "preservation requirement is self-imposed and is therefore one of 
prudence rather than jurisdiction." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, [^13, — P.3d —. 
Given the State's failure to explain why it believes the issue is not preserved, therefore, 
this Court should "exercise" its "wide discretion" to address the issue on appeal. Id. 
Besides, as explained in the opening brief, there is no need for this Court to 
determine whether the issue is adequately preserved because this Court may reach the 
issue under rule 22(e). See Appellant Br. at 30-31. In the response brief, the State says 
that it will not "conced[e]" that rule 22(e) applies, but it provides no argument as to why 
rule 22(e) would not apply. See Appellee Br. at 11. Instead, it "assum[es] .. . that rule 
22(e) provides a remedy for violations of double jeopardy at sentencing" and proceeds to 
the merits of the issue. Id. Thus, despite the State's summary claim that the double 
jeopardy argument is not preserved and its summary assertion that it does not concede the 
applicability of rule 22(e), this Court should reach the merits of the claim because it is 
preserved and because the State essentially concedes that rule 22(e) applies. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED UDY'S RIGHTS TO ALLOCUTION 
AND DUE PROCESS WHEN IT DENIED UDY AND HIS COUNSEL 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING 
First, Udy's rights to allocution and due process were violated because Udy and 
defense counsel were denied the opportunity to speak at the time of sentencing. See infra 
Part II. A. Second, this Court should reach the merits of the issue because the issue is 
preserved and the State inadequately briefed its argument to the contrary, Udy has shown 
that the error was prejudicial under the plain error doctrine, and Udy's sentence is an 
illegal sentence that may be corrected at any time under rule 22(e). See infra Part II.B. 
A. Udy's Rights to Allocution and Due Process Were Violated Because Udy and 
Defense Counsel Were Denied the Opportunity to Speak At the Time of 
Sentencing. 
The State claims that Udy's rights to allocution and due process were not violated 
at the August review hearing because they were protected at the May sentencing hearing. 
See Appellee Br. at 23-28. The State's argument follows the same reasoning it employed 
in its double jeopardy argument—the August review hearing "was merely a continuation 
and conclusion of the sentencing hearing that began in May." Id. at 24. As explained in 
Part I, this argument fails because it is not supported by the record. See supra Part LA. 
The record shows that the May hearing was a complete sentencing hearing at 
which Udy's rights to allocution and due process were protected and the trial court 
imposed a legal sentence. See Appellant Br. at 35. As explained by the trial court, the 
August hearing was a review hearing: The court sentenced Udy to jail time and 
probation, but agreed to hold a "review" hearing in August in order to consider reducing 
the "jail sentence" if Udy had "paid off the restitution by then. R.287:51. When Udy and 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his counsel appeared at the August hearing, however, it became apparent that this was not 
the review hearing promised by the trial court, but a new sentencing hearing. The court 
announced: "I initially said that I was going to give him a year in jail," but "I've revisited 
this in my head." R.288:3-4. The court then imposed a new, much harsher, sentence: 
"He's going to prison to be taken forthwith, 1 to 15, zero to 5 concurrent." R.288:3. 
Udy does not complain that he was denied "the unlimited right to continue 
allocuting for as long as [he] wish[ed]." Appellee Br. at 28. Rather, he asserts that his 
right to allocution was violated because he and his attorney were not allowed to speak at 
the time of sentencing. Appellant Br. at 32-38. The right to allocution demands that the 
defendant and his counsel be given the opportunity to speak "[a]t the time of sentence." 
Utah Code §77-18-1(7); see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("Before imposing sentence the court 
shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment.. ."); State v. Milligan, 2011 UT App 390, [^16, 
265 P.3d 132 (remanding for resentencing because trial court denied the right to 
allocution by amending an illegal sentence without granting defendant the opportunity to 
argue for concurrent sentences at the time the illegal sentence was corrected). 
The right to speak at the time of sentence was critical in this case because the trial 
court's sentencing decision at the August review hearing was discretionary, and the 
denial of allocution at that hearing led the court to impose a harsher sentence based on 
speculation. The court did not allow Udy to explain why he had not received the art 
project commission yet. R.288:l-2. Instead, it concluded that Udy "lied to me" about the 
commission and "he's going to pay the price." R.288:4; see R.288:5 ("[H]e lied to me. 
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And I think I have a right to pull the plug on that because of his conduct."); R.288:5 
("And he has an obligation to this Court to tell me the truth and he didn't. So he's going 
to prison."). Further, the trial court accepted as true the State's speculation that the 
commission would never materialize because Udy "is probably being scammed and he's 
taken some of . . . this latest money that he's received from people, sent it on to this 
bigger fish that's scamming him." R.288:3. Thus, this Court should vacate the August 3 
sentencing order and impose the original May 3 sentencing order because the trial court 
violated Udy's rights to allocution and due process at the August review hearing. 
B. This Court Can Review This Issue on Appeal Because the Issue is Preserved 
and the State's Argument to the Contrary Is Inadequately Briefed, the Trial 
Court's Error Was Plain, and Udy's Sentence Is Illegal and May Be 
Corrected at Any Time Under Rule 22(e). 
This Court should reach the merits of the allocution issue because it is properly 
preserved and the State's argument to the contrary is inadequately briefed, because the 
trial court's error was plain, or because Udy's sentence is an illegal one that may be 
corrected at any time under rule 22(e). 
The allocution issue is properly preserved. The State claims that Udy did not 
preserve the allocution claim below, but the State does not support its argument with any 
analysis or citations to case law or the record. See Appellee Br. at 11. Thus, this Court 
should disregard the State's preservation argument because it is inadequately briefed. See 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), (b), (k); Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. 
Besides, the State's summarily raised preservation argument overlooks pages one 
through five of the August review hearing transcript where defense counsel preserved the 
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issue by repeatedly attempting to speak on Udy's behalf, but was prevented from doing 
so by the trial court. See R.288:l-5. As explained in the opening brief, defense counsel's 
repeated attempts to speak preserved the issue for appeal because they satisfied both 
purposes of the preservation rule. See Appellant Br. at 38-39; see Patterson, 2011 UT 68, 
1J15 ("in assessing application of our preservation rule, we find it useful to examine its 
underlying policies"). This issue can be decided from the record; it does not "'depend[] 
on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at 
trial.'" Id. (citations omitted). Thus, this Court should "exercise" its "wide discretion" to 
address the issue on appeal. Id. at [^13. 
Alternatively, this Court may reach the issue under the plain error doctrine. The 
State's brief does not address the obviousness of the error. See Appellee Br. at 23. Thus, 
the opening brief is adequate to explain obviousness. See Appellant Br. at 39. Moreover, 
the State's brief misstates the prejudice standard. The State argues that the prejudice 
standard requires Udy to show "that he would have provided the sentencing court with 
evidence or argument that would have resulted in a more favorable outcome." Appellee 
Br. at 23 (emphasis added); see id. at 30 (claiming Udy "must show that the trial court 
likely would have entered a more lenient sentence" (emphasis added)). The State also 
argues that the prejudice standard requires Udy to "demonstrate that the court would have 
been compelled to believe [his] argument or evidence." Id; see id. at 27-28 (arguing Udy 
was not prejudiced because his statements "would not have been believable"). 
In reality, the prejudice standard only requires Udy to show that the error was 
"'harmful,'" meaning that "'absent the error, there [was] a reasonable likelihood of a 
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more favorable outcome.'" State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^ |6, 18 P.3d 1123 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). This standard does not require the defendant to prove that the 
trial court "would have been compelled to believe" his statements at sentencing. Appellee 
Br. at 27-28. It only requires him to show that the trial court "could have been swayed" 
by his statements. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,1f92, 152 P.3d 321; see Milligan, 2011 UT 
App 390, ^ [16 (reversing right to allocution error in amended sentence because "we think 
it is possible that [defendant] could have convinced the court to order that the amended 
sentence be served concurrently with his other sentences"). Udy has met this standard. 
See Appellant Br. at 39-40. 
Udy had documentation to show that the art project commission was imminent, 
and he was prepared to explain the "significance" of that documentation to the court. See 
R.288:l-2. Defense counsel represented that he had maintained "contact with a number of 
Mr. Udy's creditors" and that the majority of those creditors believed Udy's assertion that 
the commission was imminent. R.288:l-2. There is a reasonable likelihood that Udy's 
explanation could have swayed the trial court too, if the court had honored Udy's right to 
allocution. See Hales, 2007 UT 14, TJ92. But the court did not give Udy the chance to 
speak. Instead, it silenced Udy and defense counsel and imposed the new sentence based 
on speculation. See Appellant Br. at 32-38. Given that the State was not seeking prison 
time in Udy's case, see R.287:45, and that the court sentenced Udy to probation when it 
permitted Udy to speak at the May sentencing hearing, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the outcome of the August review hearing would have been more favorable to Udy 
had his rights to allocution and due process not been violated. See Appellant Br. at 39-40. 
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This court may also reach the issue under rule 22(e). The State claims in a footnote 
that rule 22(e) should not apply to the allocution issue because the issue is an "ordinary or 
'run of the mill' error[]." Appellee Br. at 23 n.4 (quoting State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, 
Tf9 n.2, 232 P.3d 1008). This argument fails because Utah case law states that rule 22(e) 
encompasses sentences imposed in violation of due process, express statutory provisions, 
and/or rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
First, "the definition of illegal sentence under rule 22(e) is sufficiently broad to 
include constitutional violations that threaten the validity of the sentence." Candedo, 
2010 UT 32, fflfl 1, 14; see, e.g.. State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, ffl[18, 20-25, 177 P.3d 
637 (reviewing "[defendant's claim that Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme 
violates his Sixth Amendment rights" under rule 22(e)). Thus, when presented with a due 
process claim that threatens the validity of the sentence, Utah appellate courts have 
addressed the merits of the issue under rule 22(e). See, e.g., Candedo, 2010 UT 32, [^14 
(reviewing substantive due process claim under rule 22(e)); State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, 
Kf2-4, 48 P.3d 228 (invoking rule 22(e) to reach argument that indeterminate sentencing 
violates Utah's due process clause). 
Second, the definition of illegal sentence is sufficiently broad to include sentences 
that fail "to comply with express statutory provisions." Candedo, 2010 UT 32, [^13; see^  
e.g.. State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ffifll-13, 203 P.3d 984 (invoking rule 22(e) to reach 
argument that sentence was illegal "because it did not comply with the statutory 
requirement to determine concurrent or consecutive sentencing at the time of final 
judgment"). Utah Code section 77-18-1(7) is an express statutory provision: "At the time 
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of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant 
. . . desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence." Utah Code §77-18-1(7). 
Third, ua sentence imposed in violation of rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure may be considered a 'sentence imposed in an illegal manner5 under rule 
22(e)." State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, ^[13, 99 P.3d 858 (citation omitted). Rule 22(a) 
includes the right to allocution: "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
In this case, as explained in the opening brief, the Court may reach the merits of 
the allocution issue under rule 22(e) because the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
right to allocution, as delineated in rule 22(a) and Utah Code §77-18-1(7), and the right to 
due process. See Appellant Br. at 40. It was also imposed in an illegal manner because it 
was imposed in violation of the rights to allocution and to due process. See id, Thus, this 
Court should vacate the August sentence and impose the original May sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Udy respectfully requests that this Court vacate the amended sentence dated 
August 3, 2010, and impose the original sentence dated May 3, 2010. 
SUBMITTED this \^_ day of January, 2012. 
0(01 A, ^^p^>C 
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